The CBI Theater was not supposed to be an operational headquarters: it was merely supposed to be in charge of the administration of the American military formations in China, Burma and India. The US Army established the China Burma India Theater (CBI Theater), and placed Stilwell in command. However, as the campaign in Burma developed, he also took on a role there. Stilwell had first been posted to China as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek. Its first commander was an extremely controversial character.

However, it was not only from NCAC's divisions that trouble sprang. Greater access to American equipment and training and less influence from the Chinese leadership meant the four Chinese divisions in NCAC could be trusted a great deal more in combat.

However, the Chinese forces in NCAC were considerably better than their contemporaries in China itself. A combination of fickleness and over-centralisation by the Chinese generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek and the limited training of the Chinese forces meant that they often failed to live up to their potential. Many times during World War II, British and American commanders in India were frustrated by their Chinese allies. It was from these formations that NCAC was created. When British and Chinese forces had been forced out of Burma at the start of 1942, some Chinese forces had been obliged to retreat to India, rather than to China. The main combat power of NCAC, at least in terms of numbers, were its Chinese divisions. In 1945, under Sultan's command, NCAC – which now included the Chinese New 6th Army – aided in the drive to retake the rest of Burma. Towards the end of 1944, NCAC was reinforced by the British 36th Infantry Division. During 1944, NCAC forced the Japanese 18th Division to retreat out of northern Burma and US Army engineering battalions, assisted by Indian laborers built the Ledo Road – which joined the northern end of the Burma Road and reestablished communications between India and China. It was re-equipped at British expense and re-trained by US Army instructors.įor the campaigning season of early 1944, NCAC was augmented with Merrill's Marauders – a brigade-sized formation created by the US Army for commando -type operations in Burma. After its arrival in India, X Force was reinforced – eventually becoming the New 1st Army – a corps-level formation. In 1942, Northern Combat Area Command was formed at Ramgarh Cantonment, in India, from X Force: units (including the 22nd and 38th Divisions), which had retreated out of Burma. While it was initially intended that NCAC would operate as an integral part of the British 11th Army Group, Stilwell refused to work under General George Giffard and was made subordinate to the Supreme Commander of SEAC, Lord Louis Mountbatten. In 1945 after Stilwell was recalled, his deputy, Lieutenant General Daniel Sultan, was promoted to and assumed command.Ĭhinese Nationalist National Revolutionary Army personnel constituted most of the combat units within NCAC. For most of its existence, NCAC was commanded by United States Army General Joseph 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell (who concurrently held more senior command positions). It controlled Allied ground operations in northern Burma. The Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) was a subcommand of the Allied South East Asia Command (SEAC) during World War II. Northern Burma and Western Yunnan (1943-1945) Burma campaign (1944)

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